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THE INVOLUNTARY PUBLIC
FIGURE CLASS OF GERTZ V.
ROBERT WELCH: DEAD OR
MERELY DORMANT?

In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,1 the United States Supreme
Court defined the term "public figure" for purposes of the "actual malice" standard in defamation actions. 2 The Court described three classes of individuals who fit the public figure
mold: persons famous or notorious enough to be public figures
for all purposes, persons not generally famous but who voluntarily inject themselves into particular public controversies, and
persons who are involuntarily drawn into such controversies. 3
The Court noted that public figure status is justified for the "allpurpose" and "voluntary limited-purpose" categories primarily
because such persons assume the risks of closer public scrutiny.•
However, the Court's rationale for extending public figure status
to the third category-involuntary public figures-was, and remains, a mystery. The Gertz Court made only two passing references to the involuntary class, and failed to define it adequately. 11 Furthermore, the very existence of such a class
appeared inconsistent with the Court's emphasis on "voluntariness" throughout Justice Powell's discussion. 6
These ambiguities in Gertz prompted an immediate flurry of
conflicting interpretations as to the meaning of the involuntary
class. Two years after Gertz, the Court's decision in Time, Inc.
v. Firestone 1 sparked a new round of discussion, centering on
whether Firestone restricted the scope of the involuntary public
figure class hypothesized in Gertz. The Court's recent decisions
in Hutchinson v. Proxmire 8 and Wolston v. Reader's Digest As1

418 U.S. 323 (1974).
See note 11 and accompanying text infra.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345, 351 (1974).
Id. at 344-45.
See notes 33-35 and accompanying text infra.
See notes 30-32 and accompanying text infra.
1
424 U.S. 448 (1976).
• 443 U.S. 111 (1979).

•
•
•
•
•
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sociation, lnc., 9 have engendered still more debate about the
continued existence and meaning of involuntary public figure
status.
This article does not resolve the debate over involuntary public figures but argues instead that in light of the Court's pronouncements in Firestone, Hutchinson and Walston, ·the involuntary class should be abolished. Part I briefly traces the
evolution and significance of public figure status in defamation
law, and reviews various interpretations of the involuntary public figure references in Gertz. Part II examines the status of the
involuntary class after Firestone, Hutchinson and Walston, and
discusses the extent to which future use of the class remains
logically consistent with those decisions. Finally, the article considers the merits of such a category in defamation law, concluding that the class of involuntary public figures serves no useful
purpose and should be abandoned.
I.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE INVOLUNTARY PUBLIC FIGURE

A.

Historical Overview

The history of the "public figure" concept starts with the
landmark 1964 Supreme Court decision, New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan. 10 The Court in New York Times held that constitutional freedoms of speech and press require defamation plaintiffs who are "public officials" to prove not only that a defendant's alleged defamatory statements were false, but also that
such statements were made with "actual malice" -that is, either
with knowledge that they were false or with reckless disregard
for truth or falsity. 11 The Court emphasized America's commit• 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
10
376 U.S. 254 (1964). On the law of defamation prior to New York Times, see generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §§ 115, 118 (4th ed. 1971); Berney, Libel and the First
Amendment-A New Constitutional Privilege, 51 VA. L. REV. 1 (1965); Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel: The Modern Revised Translation, 49 CORNELL
L.Q. 581 (1964).
11
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). Later cases refined
the meaning of "actual malice." In Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), the Court
stated that "only those false statements made with the high degree of awareness of their
probable falsity demanded by New York Times may be the subject of either civil or
criminal sanctions." Id. at 74. In St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968), the Court
defined "reckless disregard for the truth" to mean subjective awareness of probable falsity: "There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in
fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication." Id. at 731. See Gertz
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ment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," 12 and concluded that imposing an "actual malice" burden on public officials was necessary to provide a necessary "breathing space" 13 for freedom of
expression.
In . Curtis Publishing Co. V. Butts 14 and Associated Press V.
Walker,1 11 a bare majority of the Court voted to extend the applicability of the New York Times "actual malice" standard to a
new cast of characters-"public figures." Chief Justice Warren's ·
opinion 16 in these companion cases pointed to the fading distinction between governmental and private sectors in this country
and emphasized the influential role played by public figures in
ordering society. 17 The opinion concluded that the public has "a
legitimate and substantial interest" in the conduct of public
figures and that freedom of the press to engage in uninhibited
debate about the involvement of public figures in public issues
and events is just as crucial as it is in the case of public officials. 18 Although seven members of the Court agreed that both
Butts and Walker were public figures, no concrete tests for dev. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 334 n.6 (1974); Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 988 (1968).
11
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
,. Id. at 271-72 (quoting N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
14
388 U.S. 130 (1967). Wally Butts was the athletic director and former head football
coach of the University of Georgia. He sued Curtis Publishing Co. for publishing an article in its Saturday Evening Post which accused him of conspiring to "fix" a football
game between the University of Georgia and the University of Alabama. Id. at 135-40.
'" 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Edwin Walker was a former Major General in the Army who
had made a number of widely publicized statements opposing physical federal intervention to enforce school desegregation orders. An Associated Press news dispatch erroneously reported that Walker had taken command of a violent crowd on the University of
Mississippi campus and had personally Jed a charge against federal marshals sent there
to effectuate a court decree ordering the enrollment of a black person as a student in the
University. Id. at 140-42.
18
Id. at 130. (Warren, C.J., concurring). Although Justice Harlan announced the results in both cases, Chief Justice Warren's opinion formed the basis for the majority on
the "actual malice" issue, concluding that "differentiation between 'public officials' and
'public figures' and adoption of separate standards of proof for each have no basis in law,
logic, or First Amendment policy." Id. at 163. Justices Brennan and White agreed with
the Chief Justice on that question in a separate opinion. Id. at 172 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justices Black and Douglas, in yet another opinion,
reiterated their long-held view that publishers should have an absolute immunity from
liability for defamation, but they acquiesced in the Chief Justice's reasoning in order to
enable a majority of the Justices to agree on the question of the appropriate constitutional privilege for defamation of public figures. Id. at 170 {Black, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). The minority (Justices Harlan, Clark, Stewart, and Fortas)
would have applied to "public figures" a different standard requiring "a showing of
highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of
investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers." Id. at 155.
11
Id. at 163-64.
18
Id. at 164.
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termining that status were advanced. 19
In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 20 the Court briefly extended the "actual malice" standard of New York Times to all
"issues of public or general concern . . . . " 21 Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority on this issue, said that the Court's decisions since New York Times had made it clear that the First
Amendment's impact on state libel laws derives more from
whether the allegedly defamatory publication concerns an issue
of public or general interest than from any "public" or "private"
label attached to the plaintiff. 22
This issue:.oriented focus was short-lived, however. In Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 23 Gertz, an attorney representing a family
suing a police officer, was falsely charged with "engineering" the
policeman's conviction of second degree murder in related criminal proceedings. The article also implied that Gertz had a criminal record and labeled him a "Leninist" and a "Communistfronter. "2' In holding that Gertz was not a public figure, the
Court repudiated Rosenbloom and returned to the Butts/Walker
approach of focusing on the plaintiff, not the issue, in deciding
public figure status. 211
1
• Chief Justice Warren described public figures simply as persons, other than public
officials, who are "intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions or,
by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at large." Id. (Warren, C.J., concurring). Justice Harlan's opinion offered somewhat more guidance, suggesting that "Butts may have attained (public figure) status by position alone and
Walker by his purposeful activity amounting to a thrusting of his personality into the
'vortex' of an important public controversy. . . . " Id. at 155. Justice Harlan stressed that
both men were sufficiently well known and had sufficient access to the media to expose
the falsity of the alleged defamatory statements. Id. Ultimately, however, he appeared to
defer to the rules of common law tort as defining the limits of the "public figure" class.
Id. at 154. Recognizing that unlike New York Times, the Butts and Walker actions could
not be analogized to prosecutions for seditious libel, Justice Harlan sought guidance
from established rules of liability with respect to compensation of persons injured by the
improper performance of a legitimate activity by another. He concluded that both Butts
and Walker would have been labeled "public figures" under common law tort rules. Id.
•• 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
21
Id. at 44. Rosenbloom, a distributor of nudist magazines, was arrested for selling
allegedly obscene material. He sued a local radio station for failing to note in two of its
braodcasts that the items of his inventory seized in a police raid were only "allegedly"
obscene, and for making references to "the smut literature racket" and "girlie-book peddlers" in its coverage of the subsequent court proceedings. Although Rosenbloom was
neither a "public official" nor a "public figure" within the meaning of the Court's previous decisions, a plurality nonetheless found the stricter New York Times "actual malice"
standard applied to him.
22
Id.
•• 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
•• Id. at 326.
•• Id. at 343, 346. But see notes 44-45 and accompanying text infra for an argument
that the Gertz "involuntary public figure" class was a partial retention of the Rosen-
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The Court's discussion of public figures in Gertz proceeded in
three steps. First, the Court distinguished private and public
defamation plaintiffs so as to justify the imposition of a greater
burden of proof on the latter group. The Court focused on the
enhanced ability of public figures to counteract false statements
because of their superior media access, 26 and, more importantly,
their assumption of the risk of closer public scrutiny by involvement in public affairs. 27 Next, the Court distinguished between
individuals whose pervasive fame or notoriety makes them public figures "for all purposes," and those who become public
figures for a limited range of issues. 28 Finally, the Court analyzed Gertz' status and held that he was not a public figure. 29
Throughout its analysis, the Court in Gertz emphasized the
importance of "voluntariness" in the public figure equation. The
Court, in justifying an "actual malice" standard for public
figures, stressed that such persons generally have "voluntarily
exposed themselves" to the risk of increased media exposure. 30
In addition, the Court pointed to Gertz' lack of voluntary conduct as a primary reason for refusing to label him a public
figure, finding Gertz not to be an "all-purpose" public figure because clear evidence that he had pervasively involved himself in
the affairs of society was lacking, 31 and not to be a "limited-purpose" public figure because he neither "thrust himself into the
vortex" of the public issue nor "engaged the public's attention in
an attempt to influence its outcome." 32 The words "expose," "involve," "thrust," and "engage" all point to the importance of
"voluntariness" in making public figure determinations.

B.

The Ambiguous Language of Gertz

Given the Gertz opinion's emphasis on voluntariness, the
suggestion of an involuntary class of public figures seems out of
place. Yet two passages in Gertz indicate that the Court contembloom issue-oriented approach. A second major holding of Gertz was that use of a strict
liability standard against defendants who defame non-"public" individuals is unconstitutional. The Court held that the states are free to decide for themselves the appropriate
standard of liability to be applied to media defamation defendants-provided that liability without fault is not imposed. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
•• Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
17
Id.
•• Id. at 345, 351.
•• -1d. at 352.
•• Id. at 344.
11
Id. at 352 .
.. Id.
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plated just such a category. First, the Court stated that
"[h]ypothetically, it may be possible for someone to become a
public figure through no purposeful action of his own," 33 cautioning, however, that "instances of truly involuntary public
figures must be exceedingly rare. " 34 Second, the Court stated
later in the opinion that the category of limited-purpose public
figures includes, in addition to those who voluntarily inject
themselves into particular public controversies, individuals who
are "drawn into" such controversies. 311 This "drawn into" language suggests a broader involuntary public figure class than
does the Court's earlier "lack of purposeful action" language.
Nowhere else in Gertz was an involuntary public figure class
mentioned or explained.
Since Gertz, commentators and courts have expressed views
about the meaning of the involuntary public figure references in
that decision. These views have been widely divergent, reflecting
both the ambiguity of the Court's choice of words in the "involuntary" passages and the difficulty of reconciling those passages
with the general tenor of the Gertz decision. One view of the
Gertz involuntary public figure is that the Court was not positing the existence of a third public figure class. Rather, the Court
was acknowledging that not all individuals who attain public
figure status make conscious decisions to accept the risk of increased media exposure. Some individuals might become public
figures without purposeful action-they might not realize that
by their positions or conduct they are running the risk of closer
public scrutiny. 36 This interpretation, however, is seriously
flawed. The words "purposeful action" more naturally refer to
an individual's decision either to occupy a particular position or
engage in conduct which will transform him into a public
figure 37 than to the deliberateness of his assumption of risk.
Under such a more natural reading the Court's "lack of purposeful action" passage indeed contemplates a new, "involun•• Id. at 345.
•• Id.
•• Id. at 351.
•• This view was articulated in Schultz v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 468 F. Supp. 551, 560
(E.D. Mich. 1979), where the court said:
[A] qualitative distinction must be made regarding types of involuntariness. On
the one hand, a person who engages in conduct that unintentionally or unknowingly attracts public attention might be classed as an involuntary public figure
because in some sense he can be said to have assumed the risk of his own conduct. On the other hand, a person who becomes the object of public attention
through no action of his own cannot be said in any real sense to have assumed
the increased risk of defamation and would not therefore become a public figure.
37
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345, 352 (1974).

~
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tary" public figure class of defamation plaintiffs.
A second view treats the involuntary class as composed of celebrities who attempt to return to anonymity, but who are unable to because of persistent press attention. 38 This view finds it
appropriate that such persons remain public figures because
their power and influence may continue despite their efforts to
renounce publicity. 39 The problem with this interpretation is its
requirement of past public figure status. Gertz described the involuntary public figure as one who "become[s] a public figure
through no purposefur'action of his own"40 -not as one who remains a public figure despite wishes to the contrary.
A third interpretation suggests that individuals may become
public figures by merely having associated with persons in certain defined groups. This interpretation has been advanced in
two forms. The first form contemplates a class of public figures
comprised of individuals involved in or affected by the actions of
public officials:n The second form is more expansive, encompassing associations with public figures as well as public officials.•2 The problem with both forms is the apparent absence of
See Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, 627 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Note, An
Analysis of the Distinction Between Public Figures and Private Defamation Plaintiffs
Applied to Relatives of Public Persons, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 1131, 1206, 1218 (1976).
3
•
Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, 627 F.2d 1287, 1295 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(ousted president of major consumer cooperative, in action against trade publication,
held a voluntary public figure for the limited purpose of comment on his trade innovation policies).
•• Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
•• For adherents to this view see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§§ 12-13, at
643-44 (1978); Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEX. L. REV. 422, 450-51
(1975). This interpretation derives from statements by Justice White in his concurring
opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 61-62 (1971) (White, J., concurring). Justice White felt that failure to extend the New York Times privilege to such
individuals would often deprive the public of full information about official actions because the press would be reluctant to divulge the names of private individuals involved
in an episode with officials whenever the publicity would be unfavorable. He concluded,
"it is rarely informative for a newspaper or broadcaster to state merely that officials
acted unless he also states the reasons for their action and the persons whom their action
affected." Id. at 61.
•• See Bamberger, Public Figures and the Law of Libel: A Concept in Search of a
Definition, 33 Bus. LAW. 709, 722 (1978). The author states that otherwise private individuals may attain public figure status by "proximity, close relationship or involvement
with those who command the public eye." Id. at 722. Bamberger suggests that this category would seem most closely related to the involuntary public figure class referred ·to by
the Supreme Court in Gertz.
The most famous court decision supporting this view is Meeropol v. Nizer, 381 F.
Supp. 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd in relevant part, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978). The court held in that case that the children of Julius and
Ethel Rosenberg were public figures, basing its conclusion on the "spotlight" shed on the
·children by reason of their parents' fame. The court said of the Meeropols, "As children
of famous parents, they achieved 'general fame or notoriety in the community.'" [Citing
38
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any principled limitation restricting the size of the resulting involuntary class. Without such limitation, the "associations" interpretation, in any form, is inconsistent with the Court's statement in Gertz that "involuntary public figures must be
exceedingly rare. " 43
Finally, a fourth explanation of the debated Gertz passages is
that the Court was hesitant to sever all ties to the issue-oriented
Rosenbloom approach."" According to this theory, the Court inserted the "lack of purposeful action" and "drawn into"
passages so that it could apply the actual malice standard to
otherwise "private" defamation plaintiffs when necessary to protect media investigation into public issues of overriding importance. 411 The difficulty with this approach is that it requires the
courts to make ad hoc determinations as to when an issue is so
important that the public's interest in its discussion outweighs
the concern for protection of a defamation victim who has in no
Gertz.] Notwithstanding the fact that plaintiffs later may have renounced the public
spotlight by changing their name to Meeropol, as children they were the subjects of considerable public attention." 381 F. Supp. at 34. It is clear that the Rosenberg children
neither occupied positions of persuasive power and influence nor thrust themselves to
the forefront on any public controversy. It would appear, therefore, that to be consistent
with Gertz, the Meeropol decision must be read as holding that the plaintiffs were themselves members of the Supreme Court's hypothetical class of involuntary public figures.
Other decisions arguably supporting this interpretation of the involuntary class include: Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 210 (7th Cir. 1976) (wife of famous entertainer held to "more or less automatically [become) at least a part-time public figure
herself'); Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440, 444-45 (S.D. Ga.
1976), aff'd, 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978) (plaintiff held a public figure because of his
"voluntary contacts and involvements" with underworld figures and the Teamsters
Union); Buchanan v. Associated Press, 398 F. Supp. 1196, 1202-03 (D.D.C. 1975) (plaintiff held a public figure because of his relationship with the finance committee to reelect
the president, which committee itself "was surely the legitimate object of searching public scrutiny").
For examples of pre-Gertz decisions finding public figures "by association," see Bamberger, supra, at 722.
•• Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). The Court in Gertz' considered extending public figure status to "individuals involved in or affected by the actions
of public officials," see note 41 and accompanying text supra, but said that doing so
would "significantly," and thus, presumably, unduly, extend the New York Times privilege. 418 U.S. at 347 n.10. Since the broader "public figure by association" concept discussed by Bamberger, see note 42 and accompanying text supra, would extend the privilege even futher, it is unlikely that the Court envisioned this as the basis of involuntary
public figure status either.
•• Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). See notes 20-22 and accompanying text supra.
•• Note, Public Figures, Private Figures and Public Interest, 30 STAN. L. REV. 157,
170 n.93 (1977). See Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76
CoLUM. L. REV. 1205, 1215 (1976). Professor Hill concludes that although the Court in
Gertz indicated that involuntary public figure status would be accorded very sparingly,
"it is difficult to see how the necessary determination can be made at all except in terms
of relative public interest." Id.
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way invited attention or comment.
In sum, this variety of views illustrates the difficulty of discerning the Court's original theory about the involuntary class
mentioned in Gertz. The meaning of the word "involuntary" in
the "lack of purposeful action" passage is peculiarly elusive. It
has been interpreted to mean everything from unknowing assumption of risk, to unwilling retention of risk due to past fame,
to undesired or unintentional assumption of risk occasioned
either by association with "public" persons or by involvement in
important public issues. Furthermore, except for the interpretation viewing involuntary public figures as persons seeking to renounce past fame, none of the explanations admitting the existence of a distinct, involuntary class is subject to any principled
limitation which brings it within the terms of the Court's "exceedingly rare" language in Gertz. These factors suggest that
whatever the Court meant by the involuntary public figure references in Gertz, the concept was not well formulated and its
boundaries were not adequately defined.
II.

THE EFFECT OF THE PosT-GERTZ CAsEs:

Is

THE

INVOLUNTARY PUBLIC FIGURE STILL VIABLE?

A.

The Post-Gertz Cases

Since the Gertz decision in 1974, the Supreme Court has decided three cases dealing with public figure issues, all of them
denying public figure status to the plaintiffs involved. In Time,
Inc. v. Firestone,4 6 the former wife of the heir to the Firestone
tire fortune sued Time magazine for misstating details of her divorce proceedings, and was held not to be a public figure. 47 In
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 48 the Court similarly refused to impose
public figure status on a professor whose work was· publicized as
•• 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
47
Mrs. Firestone brought a lawsuit against Time magazine for its publication of and
refusal to retract an article falsely reporting that her divorce was granted on grounds of
extreme cruelty and adultery. The jury found for Mrs. Firestone, and the judgment was
affirmed by the Florida appellate courts. Although the United States Supreme Court
vacated and remanded the case for further proceedings, a majority of the Justices found
that Mrs. Firestone was not a public figure. Relying on Gertz, they held in an opinion by
Justice Rehnquist that Mrs. Firestone neither "assume[d] any role of especial prominence in the affairs of society" nor "thrust herself to the forefront of any particular
public controversy in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved in it." Id. at
453.
•• 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
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an example of wasteful governmental spending. 49 Finally, in the
companion case to Hutchinson, Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association, 110 an individual falsely named as a Soviet spy in a book
written and published by the defendants was also deemed not to
be a public figure. 111 This Part analyzes the effects of Firestone,
Hutchinson and Wolston on the involuntary public figure class,
examining to what extent lower courts may hold that a person is
a member of the class consistent with these decisions.
A strong case can be made that Time, Inc. v. Firestone 112 destroyed the involuntary public figure class. 113 The Firestone
•• The professor alleged that he was injured by Senator Proxmire's references in a
press release and in newsletters to constituents to his studies as an example of wasteful
government spending, and by the award of Proxmire's "Golden Fleece of the Month
Award" to the federal agencies which provided the funding for his studies. Both the
district court and the Court of Appeals agreed that Hutchinson was a public figure for
the limited purpose of comment on his receipt of federal funds for research projects. The
Supreme Court reversed, however, holding that neither Hutchinson's successful application for federal funds nor his access to the media, as demonstrated by the fact that his
response to the announcement of the Golden Fleece Award was reported by some newspapers and wire services, established that he was a public figure prior to the controversy
engendered by the Golden Fleece Award. Id. at 134-36. The Court stated that to the
extent Hutchinson's writings became a matter of controversy, it was a consequence of
the Golden Fleece Award, and concluded that "those charged with defamation cannot,
by their own conduct, create their own defense by making the claimant a public figure."
Id. at 135. The Court found Hutchinson's access to the media insufficient to make him a
public figure because that access "was limited to responding to the announcement of the
Golden Fleece Award." Id. at 136.
In a related holding, the Court said that neither the Senator's newsletters nor his press
release was protected by the speech or debate clause of the Constitution, because neither
was essential to the deliberations of the Senate nor a part of the deliberative process. Id.
at 133.
•• 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
•• Both courts below held that Wolston was a public figure, basing their decisions on
Wolston's failure to appear before a grand jury investigating into the activities of Soviet
intelligence agents in the United States, which, by way of subsequent contempt proceedings, had attracted substantial media attention. The lower courts concluded that by failing to appear, Wolston "voluntarily thrust" or "injected" himself to the forefront of the
public controversy surrounding the investigation of Soviet espionage in the United
States, and thereby became a "public figure" under Gertz. 443 U.S. at 165. The Supreme
Court disagreed. It held that the mere fact that Wolston voluntarily chose not to appear
before the grand jury, knowing that his action might be attended by publicity, was not
decisive on the question of public figure status.
First, the Court found it difficult to characterize Wolston's conduct as voluntary. "It
would be more accurate to say that he was dragged unwillingly into the controversy." Id.
at 166. Second, it held that Wolston's role in whatever public controversy there may
have been concerning the investigation of Soviet espionage was only minor. Id. at 167.
Third, the Court rejected the contention that the "newsworthiness" of the events was
sufficient in itself to make Wolston a public figure. Id. Finally, the Court stated that
Wolston's conduct did not constitute "an attempt to influence the resolution of the issues involved." Id. at 168.
•• 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
•• For commentators espousing this view, see, e.g., Ashdown, Gertz and Firestone: A
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Court conspicuously omitted the "lack of purposeful action" and
"drawn into" passages from its recap of the Gertz "public
figure" definition, 114 evidence that the involuntary class is not a
central part of the Court's conception of public figures. Additionally, the Court stated that although participants in some litigation may be legitimate public figures, "the majority will more
likely resemble [Mrs. Firestone], drawn into a public forum
largely against their will. . . . " 00 Use of the phrase "drawn into"
in this passage conflicts with the Court's earlier statement in
Gertz that a person could become a public figure by being
"drawn into" a public controversy. Furthermore, defendant
Time magazine advanced the argument that Mrs. Firestone
achieved public figure status by becoming "embroiled in a public
controversy because of her· relationship to Russell Firestone,"06
who, the magazine asserted, was himself a public figure "beyond
any possible doubt." 07 Time thus sought to bring Mrs. Firestone
within the "public figure by association" interpretation of the
involuntary class. 118 Significantly, the Court made no mention of
this argument in its decision.
Despite the above evidence, the involuntary public figure class
suggested in Gertz may have nonetheless survived the Firestone
decision. Gertz restricted limited-purpose public figure status to
individuals who either voluntarily inject themselves or are drawn
into "a particular public controversy." 119 Since the Court expressly found no "public controversy" in Firestone, 60 it was
therefore not obligated to rule on the involuntary public figure
Study in Constitutional Policy-Making, 61 MINN. L. REV. 645, 681-82 n.175 (1977);
Note, Developing Standards of Care After Time, Inc. v. Firestone: Experimentation is
Needed, 29 MERCER L. REV. 841, 849 (1978) .
.. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453 (1976) .
.. Id. at 457 (emphasis added) .
.. Brief for Petitioner at 35, Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
•• Id .
.. See note 42 and accompanying text supra. The magazine cited Meeropol v. Nizer,
381 F. Supp. 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd in relevant part, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978), see note 42 supra, in support of this argument and
appeared to analogize the position of Mrs. Firestone to that of the Rosenberg sons in
that case. Brief for Petitioner at 35, Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
•• Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974).
00
The Court said:
Petitioner contends that because the Firestone divorce was characterized by
the Florida Supreme Court as a "cause celebre," it must have been a public
controversy and respondent must be considered a public figure. But in so doing
petitioner seeks to equate "public controversy" with all controversies of interest
to the public. Were we to accept this reasoning, we would reinstate the doctrine
advanced in the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom ....
Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976).
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issue before it. The absence of discussion on that issue does not
necessarily mean a repudiation of the involuntary class; and
Firestone contains no language expressly precluding future defamation plaintiffs from being deemed involuntary public figures.
The second of the Supreme Court's most recent public figure
cases, Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 61 adds support to the argument
that the involuntary public figure class has been abandoned. As
in Firestone, the Court made no reference to the class, construing Gertz as establishing only two categories of public figures. 61
Furthermore, although the issue of Dr. Hutchinson's possible involuntary public figure status was not raised in the litigation,
the professor would seem to have been a likely candidate for
that status insofar as he was drawn out of the laboratory and
into the public spotlight by Senator Proxmire's statements; the
Court's failure to discuss the issue weighs against the involuntary category's continued viability. Nevertheless, the involuntary
public figure class arguably may have survived the Hutchinson
decision. As in Firestone, the Court found no "public controversy" in which the plaintiff had become involved,68 and could
therefore sidestep the "involuntary" issue without necessarily
:repudiating the class.
Finally, the Court's decision in Wolston v. Reader's Digest
Association" further bolsters the argument that the involuntary
public figure class has been abolished sub silentio. Once again,
the Court made no mention in its decision of the involuntary
class, referring only to the "all-purpose" and "voluntary limitedpurpose" categories. 611 As in its Firestone decision, the Court ignored the defendant's argument that Gertz recognized both voluntary and involuntary public figure status.66 The defendants
argued that Wolston could be viewed as an involuntary public
figure because of his involvement in the grand jury's investigation of Soviet espionage and his identification as a Soviet agent
in a report prepared by the FBI. 67 The defendants thus sought
to bring Wolston within the "involvement in important issues"
interpretation of the involuntary class. 68 The Supreme Court,
" 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
11
Id. at 134.
ea Id. at 135.
.. 443 U.S. 157 (1979) .
.. Id. at 164.
.. Brief for Respondent at 30-31, Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157
(1979).
•• Id. at 32 n.7.
80
See notes 44-45 and accompanying text supra. The American Society of Newspaper
Editors and the National Newspaper Association raised the involuntary public figure is-
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however, made no mention of this argument, casting the public
figure issue solely in terms of" 'thrust[ing] ... to the forefront
of particular public controversies.' " 89 The Court never considered whether Wolston might have become a limited-purpose
public figure by being "drawn into" the alleged public controversy involved in that case.
Although the evidence that the Court has abandoned the involuntary public figure class is significant, it remains inconclusive. As in both Firestone and Hutchinson the Court in Walston
avoided meeting the involuntariness issue head-on, this time by
holding that the plaintiff failed to meet the "other criteria established in Gertz for public figure status."70 Perhaps the other
criterion Wolston failed to meet was "playing a major role" in
the alleged public controversy, investigation of Soviet espionage
in the United States. Gertz requires the focus of the limitedpurpose public figure inquiry to be on the "nature and extent of
an individual's participation in the particular controversy giving
rise to the defamation. " 71 This language can be read to permit
involuntary status only where the plaintiff plays a major role in
a public controversy. Defamation plaintiffs who play but a minor
role in public controversies will not be deemed public figures
-voluntary or involuntary. Since the Court in Walston did refer
to the plaintiff's minor role in the investigation of Soviet espionage, this element of the case arguably was the key factor in
denying involuntary public figure status to him.

B.

Viability of the Involuntary Public Figure Category

Although the Supreme Court has chosen in its three postGertz public figure cases not to abort the involuntary public
figure class in explicit terms, the category's viability is fast failsue even more strongly in their amicus curiae brief. After quoting the "drawn into" passage from Gertz, the amici stated that a small but recognized class of persons exist who
are limited public figures through their involuntary involvement in significant contemporary issues. Brief of the American Society of Newspaper Editors and the National Newspaper Association, Amici Curiae, In Support of Affirmance at 5, Wolston v. Reader's
Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979). The amici argued that Wolston was a member of that
class. Apparently attempting to distinguish Firestone, they emphasized that the instant
case did not involve "activities of a personal or private nature;" rather, Walston involved
a legitimate "public controversy" surrounding "the most publicly discussed issue of the
day," namely, "the congressional and grand jury investigation in the 1950's into the activities and identities of Soviet agents in the United States." Id. at 6.
•• Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 165 (1979).
•• Id. at 166 n.8.
11
Id. at 352.
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ing. The Court has consistently and conspicuously deleted involuntary public figure references from its opinions. It has avoided
discussing involuntary public figure issues properly before it. In
such a hostile environment, the involuntary public figure cannot
long survive. Though the Court seems unwilling to deal the class
a death blow, the continuation of its present course will undoubtedly have the same ultimate effect.
Given the present status of the Gertz involuntary public figure
class in defamation law, a single question remains: does the class
serve to further an accommodation of the competing interests
involved in this area, or should it be abolished? The imposition
of a higher, "actual malice" burden of proof on certain defamation .plaintiffs is justified primarily by society's interest in assuring "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate on public issues.79 It is difficult to see how the existence of an involuntary
public figure class furthers this interest. As long as there is no
clear test for involuntary public figure status, the media will
have no meaningful standard by which to gauge its conduct. Use
of the class would therefore result only in the rare denial of liability to otherwise liable defamation defendants and do little to
decrease harmful self-censorship. It does little good to provide
the media an additional measure of protection if the media cannot determine when it is being protected.
Even if the Court were to develop a workable test for involuntary public figures-such as imposing a requirement of previous
fame 73-strong arguments weigh against the category's future
use. The involuntary class was only tenuously suggested in
Gertz; the Court has made no mention of it in more recent cases.
It might therefore be unprincipled for the Court now to declare
someone to be an involuntary public figure. If only to remain
consistent with the trend of the cases, the Court ought to administer the coup de grace and expressly abolish the class. An
even more important policy consideration is that the Court has
itself weighed the equities and found "voluntariness" to be a
vital requisite for public figure status. This was made clear in
Wolston where, in the face of strong involuntary public figure
arguments in the defendants' brief, the Court relied heavily on
the lack of voluntariness in Wolston's conduct in deciding that
he was not a public figure. 74 With such heavy stress on volun71

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
See notes 38-40 and accompanying text supra.
74
The Court went so far as to justify its refusal to deem Wolston a public figure partly
on the ground that he was "dragged unwillingly into the controversy" surrounding the
investigation of Soviet espionage in the United States. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n,
71
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tariness in Gertz and its progeny, the Court could not now consistently determine that an individual is a public figure where
that voluntariness is lacking. 711
CONCLUSION

The Court attempted in Gertz to define and classify "public
figures," who, in order that the press would discuss their actions
freely, would bear an especially high burden of proof in defamation suits. In so doing, the Court hypothesized a class of involuntary public figures which was and continues to be inconsistent
with the rest of its analysis. This inconsistency has been highlighted by the Court's failure even to mention involuntary public
figures in any of its more recent cases, and has increasingly
shifted the focus of debate to whether the class continues to
exist. The "involuntary public figure" cannot be pronounced
legally dead until the Supreme Court expressly declares it so.
Nevertheless, the trend of the cases, the lack of a concrete and
workable test, and the Court's own resolution of the value
choices in this area bode ill for the probability and propriety of
the category's future use.

-Dale K. Nichols

443 U.S. 157, 166 (1979).
70
Finally, it should be noted that elimination of the involuntary class would not leave
the press defenseless. Even where a plaintiff is not a public figure, he must, at a minimum, prove "fault" in order to comply with the constitutional requirements set forth in
Gertz. See note 25 supra.

